Editorial: Retired Soldier Tries To Take One For The Team

There has been a lot written about Hurricane Katrina and how it came about that it was able to do so much damage in the New Orleans area. Follow-up assessment is always prudent, provided we learn from our mistakes.

Much of the hue and cry from the region comes from those who were hurt, financially and otherwise, by that marauding storm’s dance across the land. We believe—and we think our position has considerable support—that government at all levels failed the residents and business operators in the area. Be that as it may, one phase of the follow-up has as its focus “who to blame.”

Honest brokers have rightly said that there is enough blame to go around. After all, levees and dikes have been under construction in New Orleans for 300 years. Many planners and builders and project opponents have been in their graves a long time—some for centuries. The same can be said of congressional delegates who vote for the laws that tell the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers what it can and cannot do. Moreover, those in Washington circles tell the Corps what it must do.

These congressional delegates, all men of high calling, are as vulnerable to the pressures of their constituents as ice is to sunshine. Opponents of various flood-control projects over the years have convinced some in Congress to vote against needed projects.

Protection from storms and the sea have long been subjects of concern along the Gulf. Marshes that once offered protection against storm surges have long since been destroyed. But then, as bad as natural erosion was and is, political bias at all levels raised its ugly head. Like angry cats trapped in a barrel and fighting over one mouse, aginners ripped into planners, playing down the value of their project proposals, hoping to steer public dollars in a different direction, something more to their liking. Ultimately they succeeded.

In the midst of all this, just over 30 years ago, Elvin R. “Vald” Heiberg III took over as commanding officer of the New Orleans Engineer District. At the time, the Corps was planning twin barriers at the east end of Lake Pontchatrain, where the gates would remain open except during the approach of large storms. These barriers were to supplement dikes and levees nearer the city, but Corps planners believed these dikes and levees would be problematic.

At that point, several groups, including Save Our Wetlands, fought to stop the Corps from designing those twin barriers. The Corps clung tightly to its belief, but opponents went to court to stop them. After Heiberg left New Orleans, a federal judge was persuaded to order that the design of the barriers be halted. The mantra seemed to be “Just build the levees higher!” The Corps knew that was the wrong answer.

Several more years passed, and the Corps was still hoping beyond hope that the barrier design could be resumed. The planners thought them to be essential to New Orleans for the protection against hurricanes. Fast track to Washington 1985, when Heiberg became Chief of Engineers. The opponents against the twin barriers were as strong as ever. Upon the advice of his staff, which brought him a proposal to give up the battle, Heiberg finally let go. Discouraged, he decided that the judge and Louisiana had spoken.

“The Corps simply had not convinced the system,” he opines today.

In retrospect, Heiberg believes giving up was the biggest mistake he’s made during his career as an Army officer. If there is any remote satisfaction in it, the recent review of the Katrina engineering issues (by the American Society of Civil Engineers) has reconfirmed the need for those barriers, or at least something like them.

Too many are still rushing around trying to find someone to blame for the levee failures, he explained in a letter to The Times-Picayune on June 22. Like a brave old soldier standing between the Christians and charging lions in the Coliseum, he symbolically says, take me. I’m the one. “Blame me. I gave up too easily.”

No, Sir! Not so fast. You cannot, rightfully, shoulder the blame for so many hundreds (perhaps thousands of people over the decades) who played key roles in paving the way for Katrina’s devastating invasion.

The tragic scenario that is New Orleans is a magnified version of what has happened to a lesser degree with numerous other flood- and storm-control projects over the years. When the people and organizations that oppose the projects are wrong and devastation occurs, they never accept responsibility.

It is good to remind ourselves that Rome wasn’t built in a day. Monumental projects take time. With every new rising of the sun, a new anti-this or anti-that organization raises its ugly head to muddle up the works. One must, using the best information available at the time, surge ahead to do those things that they know in their hearts need doing. To wait is tragic.

If readers suspect that some of this material came directly from Heiberg’s letter, they are correct. But he didn’t supply it. We have known Gen. Heiberg for decades. We never heard anything but complimentary words about his service. He didn’t fail. He got trampled on. And so have a lot of other good Corps people.

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